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Accrediting Agencies' Legal
Responsibilities: In Pursuit of the Public
Interest*
WILLIAM A. KAPLINt

I.

Introduction

There was a time when accreditation, like higher education, was a
private or internal matter governed by the accreditors and educators
themselves, unimpeded by government. There was likewise a time
when professional associations, whether in education, the health professions, or other fields claiming special expertise, operated relatively
free from scrutiny by legislatures, courts, or other arms of government. But times have changed, and with changing times conceptions
of law and public policy have also changed.1
In recent history public interest and governmental involvement in
education have been expanding.2 Similarly, the public's interest in
professional matters and the operation of professional associations
has increased, as has government's tendency to become involved with
such concerns.3 Accreditation lies at the convergence of these two social movements. Being part of the educational process, accreditation
* Copyright 0 1982, Council on Postsecondary Accreditation. COPA originally published this
work, under the same title, as part of its "Occasional Paper" series. It is reprinted here by
permission, with expanded footnotes and minor textual revisions.
The author acknowledges Charles Chambers, COPA's General Counsel, for his perceptive
critique of the draft manuscript and for the foreword he prepared for the "Occasional Paper"
version of this work.
t Professor of Law, Catholic University. Consultant to the General Counsel, Catholic University. Consultant to the Study of Accreditation of Selected Health Education Programs, 1971-72.
Consultant to COPA Task Force on Accreditation and the Public Interest, 1977-80.
" See, e.g., Tobriner & Grodin, The Individual and the Public Service Enterprise in the
New Industrial State, 55 CALI. L. RaV. 1247 (1967); Sloss & Becker, The Organization Affected with a Public Interest and Its Members - Justice Tobriner'sContributionto Evolving
Common Law Doctrine, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 99 (1977); W. Selden, Accreditation and the Public
Interest (COPA, 1976).
2See, e.g., H.R. BOWEN, THE STATE OF THE NATION AND THE AGENDA FOR HIGHER EDUCATION
(Jossey-Bass 1982).
3 See, e.g., C. GraB, HIDDEN HIERARCHIES: THE PROFESSIONS AND GOVERNMENT (1966).
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has been affected by increased concern for educational matters; being
a function performed by professional associations claiming special expertise, accreditation has also been affected by the shift in public and
governmental attitudes toward these matters. These forces have
changed public policy regarding accreditation and have affected the
ways in which government, especially its judicial branches, has
viewed questions concerning accreditation and the functioning of accrediting agencies.
This article considers the evolution in the way courts have labeled
or categorized accrediting agencies, and the legal and policy consequences of this evolution. Discussion will then focus on the "public
interest" standard that is the core of these developments and on
ways in which accrediting agencies can fulfill their legal responsibilities under this standard.
I.

Legal Categories for Accreditation

The law generally characterizes organizations and associations into
one of four basic categories: (1) "governmental," (2) "quasi-governmental," (3) "quasi-public,"" and (4) "private" or "non-public." Each
category evidences a different approach to judicial review of included
entities. Governmental entities receive the highest degree of judicial
scrutiny; private entities receive the lowest - sometimes meaning no
scrutiny at all. The other two types of entities lie between these
extremes.
A governmental entity is one created and supported by law or public authority in order to serve governmental purposes. In other words,
a government entity is an arm of either the federal government or a
state or local government. Thus, federal administrative agencies such
as the United States Department of Education are governmental entities, as are state and local administrative agencies such as school
boards. Similarly, a state university or a community college would be
a governmental entity. Governmental entities are clearly subject to
federal and state constitutional limitations on their authority, such as
a requirment that they follow due process of law. Governmental entities are also subject to the restraints of their authorizing or enabling
legislation, restraints contained in administrative procedure acts, and
various other public law restraints embodied in statutes, ordinances,
" "Quasi" is a Latin phrase meaning as if, almost as it were, or analogous to. It "is used in
legal phraseology to indicate that one subject resembles another, with which it is compared, in
certain characteristics, but that there are intrinsic and material differences between them."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1410 (4th ed. 1968).
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executive orders, and administrative regulations. In interpreting and
applying this plethora of restraints, courts exercise a high level of
scrutiny of governmental entities' actions, often resulting in a judicial
invalidation of particular decisions and policies.
At the other end of the spectrum, the private entity is formed and
operated for the purely private benefit of its owners or members. The
private entity is neither created, directed nor controlled by government, nor does it act for the government. Rather, private entities are
designed to be autonomous, controlled only through voluntary arrangements of private persons or organizations in their private dealings with one another. Thus athletic clubs, social clubs, business and
commercial groups, and fraternal organizations may all be considered
to be private entities. A private entity is not subject to the federal or
state constitutional limitations that bind governmental entities, nor
is it subject to authorizing or enabling legislation or other public law
strictures applicable to governmental entities. Typically removed
from the public eye, and of little concern to government, private entities are little touched by public law. Courts thus have traditionally
played a minimal role in ordering or limiting the affairs of private
entities. While private law, such at the common law of contract and
tort, does apply, it is often used by courts in a deferential fashion in
order to protect private entities' autonomy.
Falling into neither the governmental nor the private category are
entities which, though ostensibly private, are in the public eye or of
concern to government. These entities may be either "quasi-governmental" or "quasi-public," depending upon the particular relationships they have with governmental agencies and the general public.
In either case, the law lays a considerably heavier hand on these entities than it does upon private entities.
A quasi-governmental entity is one which acts for or with the affirmative support of government, either federal, state, or local. When
the action of an ostensibly private entity "may fairly be said to be
that of the state" because "to some significant extent the state in any
of its manifestations has been found to have become involved" with
that entity, then the entity's action may be considered to be "state
action." When a private entity is found to be engaged in state action, it will be transformed in the law's eye into a quasi-governmental
entity subject to restraints of the Federal Constitution. Thus, to the
extent that the entity's action is state action, it will be subject to the
same constitutional limitations (although not other public law limita5

Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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tions) that would apply to governmental entities. The court's corresponding role is thereby enlarged and the degree of judicial scrutiny
heightened.
The quasi-public entity, on the other hand, is not engaged in state
action, and it is thus not subject to the restraints of the Federal Constitution. Nevertheless, such an entity is considered to perform functions which are in some significant degree important to society as a
whole. Thus, these entities do not exist for purely private purposes.
It is their public aspects which lead courts to label these entities
quasi-public and require that they operate "for the common good" or
"in the public interest."6 Although these requirements are based on
judge-made common law rather than the Federal Constitution, courts
do sometimes look to constitutional (or statutory) principles as evidence of the public interest. 7 This use of public law to inform the
common law process, and the open-ended character of the public interest concept, combine to yield substantial judicial scrutiny of quasipublic entities.
The process of labeling legal entities may seem technical and theoretical, but it can have very practical effects on their operations. The
choice of category can be determinative of the scrutiny courts will
give to the entity's actions and the degree to which they will limit its
discretion. The judiciary's characterization may also influence policy
decisions about particular entities made by legislatures and administrative agencies.
The next four sections examine the applicability of each legal category to accreditation by analyzing the judicial precedents on accreditation against a backdrop of related legal developments.
III. Accrediting Agencies as Governmental Entities
Occasionally state governments have conducted programs of evaluating higher educational institutions which they have called "accrediting" or which others have recognized to be activitiea in the nature
of accreditation. The primary example is the State of New York,
where the Board of Regents has for many years evaluated and recognized colleges and universities within the state's borders. While New
York does not specifically call its activities accreditation, the United
States Department of Education does recognize the New York Board
of Regents as a "nationally recognized accrediting agency" for New
I Doe v. Bridgetown Hosp. Ass'n, 366 A.2d 641 (N.J. 1976).
E.g., James v. Marinship Corp., 155 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1944).
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York institutions.8 Another example is the State of Indiana, whose
Indiana Commission for Postsecondary Proprietary Education, formerly the Indiana Private School Accrediting Commission, has "accredited" private proprietary institutions within that state. 9
Such examples of governmental accrediting activities are clearly
the exception rather than the rule. Even as to these activities, there
is considerable controversy over whether they actually constitute accreditation as that term is understood, and if they do, whether it is
good policy for states to sponsor them. There is a generally accepted
distinction between accreditation and licensure - a governmental
regulatory scheme for granting authority to operate, award degrees,
or use a collegiate name. Licensure is an appropriate, probably essential, state function, and many states engage in it. Accreditation is a
qualitatively different process of peer and professional review which
states engage in only to the extent previously noted.1"
With these qualifications, it is clear that accreditation is not, and
historically has not been, an activity conducted by states or local governments.1 1 Nor does the federal government conduct accrediting ac12
tivities. While it does officially "recognize" accrediting agencies, it
does not create or fund them and does not consider them to be governmental entities. As the U.S. Department of Education has noted:
One of the distincive features of American Education is that the develop-

ment and maintenance of educational standards are the responsibilities of
nongovernmental, voluntary accrediting associations ... It is the policy of
the Department of Education generally to support and encourage the various recognized voluntary accrediting associations in their role as the primary agents in the development and maintenance of educational standards
in the United States.13
IV. Accrediting Agencies as Private Entities
In organizational format, accrediting agencies are "non-profit,"
"voluntary" associations or corporations established under state law.
For the Secretary of Education's most recent listing, see "List of Nationally Recognized
AccreditingeAgencies and Associations," 47 Fed. Reg. 25,563, 25,565 (1982).
9 Burns Ind. Stats. Ann., tit. 20, art. 1, ch. 19 (1975 & 1981 cum. supp.).
10POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION CONVENING AUTHORITY, IEL, APPROACHES TO STATE LICENSING
OF PRIVATE DEGREE-GRANTING INsTrrTUONS (THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, 1975).
" W. SELDEN, ACCREDrrATION: A STRUGGLE OVER STANDARDS IN HIGHER EDUCATION (Harper

& Bros., N.Y., 1960).
"' J. PROFFrr, The Federal Connection for Accreditation, 50 J. OF HIGHER EDUC. 145 (1979);
cf., K. Young. Accreditation and the Office of Education, 60 EDUCATIONAL RECORD 212 (1979).
iS

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED ACCREDITING AGENCIES AND As-

SOCIATIONS: CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES FOR LISTING BY THE U.S. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION AND

CURRENT LISTING (cover inset) (1980).
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Their purposes and powers are set forth in articles of incorporation
or association and in by-laws, rules, and regulations which the agencies formulate and enforce. In this sense, accrediting agencies are
part of a broad category of "private" entities which the law has traditionally treated with deference.1"
The first reported court case dealing with accreditation emphasized
the private character of accrediting agencies. In 1938, after the North
Central Association had investigated its state agricultural college,
North Dakota brought suit against NCA. The state alleged that the
Association has threatened to withdraw the college's accreditation
and requested a preliminary injunction against such action. The federal courts rejected the state's request and decided the case in favor
of the accrediting agency in North Dakota v. North CentralAssociation of Colleges and Secondary Schools.1 5 Both the trial and appellate courts stated that the defendant association was "purely voluntary in character. '1 6 Such organizations were to be treated
deferentially, and courts should be hesitant to involve themselves in
their internal affairs.' 7 According to the trial court:
In churches, lodges and all other like voluntary associations each person, on
becoming a member, either by express stipulation or by implication, agrees
to abide by all rules and regulations adopted by the organization, and courts
will not interfere to control the enforcement of by-laws of such associations
but will leave them free to enforce their own rules and regulations by such
means and with such penalties as they may see proper to adopt for their
own government.ls

The appellate court agreed:
The Association being purely voluntary is free to fix qualifications for membership; and to provide for termination of membership of institutions which
do not meet the standards fixed by the Association. The constitution, bylaws, and rules of government of the Association measure the rights and
duties of the members.B

This 1938 case thus upholds the propositions that accrediting agencies are private (or purely private) entities; that holding and applying
for membership are voluntary choices; that the law applicable to accrediting agencies is primarily that which the agency develops itself,
14See, e.g., JudicialControl of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HARv.L. Rzv.983 (1963).
15State of North Dakota v. North Central Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary Schools, 23 F.
Supp. 694 (E.D. Ill.), afl'd, 99 F.2d 697 (7th Cir. 1938).
19Id. at 696, 99 F.2d at 698.
7 See generally Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HAiv. L.
Rzv. 993 (1930).
Is23 F. Supp. at 699.

99 F.2d at 700.
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by formulating and enforcing its own rules and regulations; and that
courts should generally abstain from reviewing accrediting actions
unless they violate the agency's own rules and thus breach the implied contract between the agency and its members.
In the next reported accreditation decision, Parsons College v.
North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools,2 0 the
court echoed the sentiments of the North Dakota opinions. The court
described the defendant as a "voluntary association of educational
institutions. . . chartered as a non-profit corporation under the laws
of Illinois ' '2 1 and suggested that such entities should be treated deferentially. In a departure from the spirit of the North Dakota opinions,
however, the Parsonscourt admitted that the "law governing actions
of this kind is not wholly free of uncertainty ' 22 Citing recent cases
dealing with medical associations and educational associations, this
court suggested that a more probing standard of judicial review could
apply. The court did not resolve its "conjecture" about applicable
law, however, since it found that the association's actions would have
been lawful even under a higher standard of review.
Thus, while Parsons is like North Dakota in viewing accrediting
agencies as private entities which make their own law without interference by public authority, the case goes beyond North Dakota in
suggesting and illustrating a less deferential form of judicial review
which would make accrediting agencies less "private" in the law's
eyes. In the latter respect, Parsons College foreshadowed events to
come in later cases. An examination of these cases, in the next two
sections, reveals that the private entity category is no longer suitable
for accreditation.
V.

Accrediting Agencies as Quasi-Governmental Entities

Courts have developed various approaches for determining whether
ostensibly private action is "state action" or "governmental action"
subject to the restraints of federal and state constitutions. 8 Generally, the private action will be considered to be state action if the
10

Parsons College v. North Central Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary Schools, 271 F. Supp. 65

(1967); see Kaplin, Judicial Review of Accreditation: The Parsons College Case, 40 J. oF
HIGHER EDUC. 543 (1969).
21 271 F. Supp. at 66.

n Id. at 70.
For the U.S. Supreme Court's most recent pronouncements, in the 1981-82 term, see Blum

23

v. Yaretsky, 102 S. Ct. 2777 (1982), Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 102 S. Ct. 2744 (1982), Rendell-

Baker v. Kohn, 102 S. Ct. 2764 (1982); see also Polk County v. Dodson, 102 S. Ct. 445 (1981).
As usual in state action cases, there were dissenting opinions filed in all these cases.
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actor is engaged in a "public" or "governmental" function or if the
government has lent substantial power, property, or prestige to the
support of the private action. In the former situation, only functions
which are "traditionally associated with sovereignty" and are "exclusively reserved to the state" will be considered public functions.24 In
the latter situation, the state must actually "foster" or "encourage"
the particular private activity at issue or the state's involvement with
the private entity must be so substantial as to "make the state a
partner or joint venturer in the enterprise. '25 In either case, "the
question of whether particular conduct is private, on the one hand, or
amounts to state action on the other hand, frequently admits of no
easy answer. ' 26 There is no "precise formula for recognition of state
responsibility [for private actions] . .

.

. Only by sifting facts and

weighing circumstances can the non-obvious involvement of the state
in private conduct be attributed its true significance."2 7

The character of accreditation and the relationships between government and accrediting agencies are such that both types of state
action arguments may be made. Indeed, such arguments have been
raised in a number of reported court decisions. The opinions reveal a
trend from complete rejection of state action arguments to clear receptivity to such arguments in the accreditation context.
In the 1938 North Dakota case the court made only a brief comment disposing of the state action issue:
[I]t is vain to appeal to a constitutional bill of rights, for such bills of rights
are intended to protect the citizen against oppression by the government,
not to afford protection against one's own agreements.28

The opinion in Parsons College is similar:
[T]he College draws no support from the commands of the federal Constitution. .

.

. By their terms, these constitutional guarantees control only the

action of government. Designed to guard the individual against the overweening power of the state, they do not control the voluntary arrangements
or relations of private citizens in their private dealings with each other.
Here there is no suggestion that the Association is an arm of government,
making its acts the action of the state. With a corporate charter granted
under general law, the Association stands on the same footing as any private
corporation organized for profit or not. The fact that the acts of the Association in granting or denying accreditation may have some effect under govJackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974).
2 Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176-77 (1972).
Id. at 172.
21Burton v. Wihmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. at 722.
2 State of North Dakota v. North Central Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary Schools, 23 F.
Supp. at 700.
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ernmental programs of assistance to students or colleges does not subject it
to the constitutional limits applicable to government, any more than a private employer whose decision to hire or fire may affect the employee's eligibility for governmental unemployment compensation."'
The next accreditation case, however, reflects a spirit distinctly different from that of North Dakota and Parsons.In Marjorie Webster
Junior College v. Middle States Association,0 the plaintiff relied extensively on the argument that the defendent association was engaged in state action. The plaintiff focused particularly on the relationship between accrediting agencies and the federal government
created by the system for dispensing federal funds to colleges - the
same factor considered and summarily rejected by the Parsons court.
The trial court in Marjorie Webster disagreed with Parsons and accepted the plaintiff's argument:
[D]efendant acts in a quasi-governmental capacity by virtue of its role in
the distribution of federal funds under the "aid to education statutes." Selection of the recipient schools is frequently dependent upon the accredited
status of the applicant. Middle States and the other regionals are officially
recognized by the United States Commissioner of Education who publishes
a list of nationally recognized accrediting agencies and associations which he
determines to be reliable authority as to the quality of training offered by
an educational institution . . . The regional accrediting associations have

operated as service3 1agencies for the federal government in determining eligibility for funding.
In addition to this relationship between the federal government
and accrediting agencies, the court also noted relationships with the
states:
Middle States' function as an agency to identify institutions of quality is
not limited to its relationship with the federal government. In states under
its jurisdiction, it has been recognized as an agency to identify institutions
of quality for purposes such as teacher certification, state loans, and state
scholarships.3 2
Imputing constitutional significance to these relations with the
state goverment as well as with the federal government, the court determined that "the defendant in performing its accreditation function is engaged in a quasi-governmental function, subjecting it to the
21Paisons College v. North Central Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary Schools, 271 F. Supp. at

70.

30

Marjorie Webster Junior College v. Middle States Ass'n, 302 F. Supp. 459 (D.D.C. 1969),

rev'd, 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see Kaplin, The Marjorie Webster Decisions on Accreditation, 52 EDUCATIONAL REc. 219 (1971).
31 302 F. Supp. at 470, 478.
33 Id. at 478.

96

Journal of Law & Education

[Vol. 12, No. I

restraints of the Constitution." ss Finding that the defendant's refusal
to consider the plaintiff for accreditation was "arbitrary, discriminatory, and unreasonable,"''1

the trial court concluded that Middle

States' action violated the Federal Constitution's due process clause.
The trial court's headline-making opinion, however, did not survive
intact. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit overruled the trial court's decision and entered judgment
for Middle States. To put the appellate decision in proper perspective, it is critical to note that the court did not disagree with the trial
court's reasoning concerning state action. Rather, for purposes of its
analysis, the appellate court "assume[d], without deciding, that either the nature of.

.

. [Middle States'] activities or the federal rec-

ognition which they are awarded renders them state action subject to
the limitations of the Fifth Amendment [due process clause]. ' 5
The last in this line of accreditation cases is Marlboro Corporation
v. Association of Independent Colleges and Schools."8 The trial court
unequivocally rejected the plaintiff's categorization of the defendant's action as state action, asserting that "defendant association's
ties with government are not sufficient to invest its actions with governmental
character under Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority."3 Although affirming the trial court's decision for the accrediting
agency, the appellate court termed the state action issue a "close
question."3 8 It did not decide the issue because "even assuming that
constitutional due process applies, the present record does not persuade us that any of. .. [the school's] procedural rights have been
violated." 39 Although reserving official judgment, the appellate court
did indicate its receptivity to the state action argument:
While it is true that there is no governmental participation in AICS, the
Commission has actively sought and received the federal recognition that
makes its grant of accreditation a prerequisite to federal program eligibility.
It appears that if AICS or an agency like it did not perform the40accreditation function, "government would soon step in to fill the void."
I Id.
XId.

"432

F.2d at 658.
Corp. v. Ass'n of Independent Colleges and Schools, 416 F. Supp. 958 (D. Mass.
1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 78 (1st Cir. 1977); see Tayler & Hilden, JudicialReview of Accrediting
Agency Actions: Marlboro CorporationDIB/Al The Emery School v. The Association of Independent Colleges and Schools, 4 J. OF Coxisou & UNIV. LAW 199 (1977).
37 Id. at 959.
" 556 F.2d at 80.

"Marlboro

30 Id.
40 Id.
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Thus the Marlboro Corporation case is ultimately in league with
the Marjorie Webster decisions rather than the older North Dakota
and Parsons cases.
In making its state action comment, the appellate court in Marlboro Corporation cited Parish v. National Collegiate Athletic Association4 1 -the leading case in a line of state action cases involving the
NCAA. As the court implied, Parish may also have applications to
accreditation. In the NCAA cases, the courts emphasized that approximately half of the Association's members are public institutions.
These public institutions, through payment of dues, provide the majority of the Association's capital and, through participation of their
representatives in the Association's governing council, wield substantial influence in decision making and standard setting. This extensive
involvement of public institutions in the affairs of a private association persuaded these courts that the NCAA's actions were state actions subject to the Constitution.
The state action analysis of the NCAA cases cannot blanketly be
applied to all accrediting agencies. At most, it could apply only selectively, depending on careful analysis of membership, finances, and organizational structure. If analysis of a particular agency indicated
public institutions exercised a clear balance of power within the
agency generally, or with respect to the matter before the court, the
NCAA cases would provide authority for yet another basis for finding
state action.
Of the various state action precedents, only the first Marjorie
Webster opinion directly holds an accrediting agency to be quasi-governmental. But other cases are sufficiently receptive to this approach
that it must be taken seriously.4 2 Pending further judicial developments, the quasi-governmental category must be considered a viable
43
one for accreditation.
Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975).
In July of 1981, a federal district court in Chicago accepted the state action approach in a
case against the accrediting agency for law schools, the American Bar Association. The court
relied on the fact that many states require graduation from an ABA-approved school as a prerequisite to bar admission. In an oral opinion, the court ruled that "many states do in fact
delegate that approval function to the ABA, [and] for perfectly proper and valid reasons, the
ABA is fulfilling a state function." See Bar Group Told Not to Use its Ban on Religious Bias,
THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., p. 14, col. 4 (July 27, 1981).
4' The state action cases from the 1981-82 term, supra note 23, do evidence the U.S. Supreme Court's disposition to tighten the quasi-governmental category. This development, traceable to 1970's cases such as Moose Lodge, supra note 25, and Jackson,supra note 24, decreases
the likelihood that accrediting agencies will be held to be quasi-governmental. See especially
Blum v. Yaretsky, supra note 23, which deals with professional medical decisions of nursing
homes participating in the Medicaid program, and Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, supra note 23,
41

42
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VI. Accrediting Agencies as Quasi-Public Entities
Although the quasi-public category has its roots in early English
common law, in its modern form it is the newest of the four categories under consideration. Its leading progenitors are a 1944 labor
union case from California, James v. Marinship Corporation," and a
1961 medical society case from New Jersey, Falcone v. Middlesex
County Medical Society. 5 In James the court asserted that "where a
union has ... attained a monopoly of the supply of labor. .. such a

union occupies a quasi-public position similar to that of a public service business and it has certain corresponding obligations. It may no
longer claim the same freedom from legal restraint enjoyed by golf
clubs or fraternal associations."4 The Falcone court characterized a
local medical society in similar fashion, emphasizing that "it is an
association with which the public is highly concerned and which engages in activities vitally affecting the health and welfare of the people . . . [It] possesses, in fact, a virtual monopoly over the use of
local hospital facilities . . . Public policy strongly dictates that this
power should not be unbridled. . . "I

Use of the quasi-public category depends on an analysis of the particular group's functions and their impact on society. As with the
quasi-governmental category, the search is for "public" functions
that affect the general "public." But unlike the quasi-governmental
category, such functions need not be the traditional and exclusive
prerogative of government; a broader and more flexible concept of
"public" applies, as the James and Falcone cases illustrate.
Like the quasi-governmental label, the quasi-public label has been
receptively considered by courts in recent accreditation cases. Use of
this label was not contemplated in the North Dakota litigation of
1938, since the category was not yet sufficiently developed in modern
law. By the time of the Parsons case in 1967, however, the quasipublic branch of law had begun to bloom. Although the Parsons
court declined to embrace its principles as the governing law for the
case, the litigation nevertheless represents a significant step toward
application of this category to accrediting agencies. The opinion both
recognizes some movement in the law away from the rule of judicial
non-interference with private associations and illustrates the analysis
which deals with the employment decisions of a private school heavily subsidized by government contracts.
" James v. Marinship Corp., 155 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1944).
"IFaicone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 170 A.2d 791 (N.J. 1961).
49 155 P.2d at 335.
47 170 A.2d at 799.
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which might apply to accrediting agencies were they considered to be
quasi-public.
As with the quasi-governmental category, it is the third case in
line, Marjorie Webster, which actually transplants the quasi-public
theory into accrediting agency ground. The Marjorie Webster trial
court mixes together quasi-governmental and quasi-public analysis,
conceptually blurring the categories. But with some sorting out, it
becomes clear that the trial court's opinion does strongly rely upon
the quasi-public category:
Over the years Middle States... has become a powerful instrumentality

which sets policies in an area of vital concern to the public. Accreditation
*

.

. confers a significant competitive advantage on defendant's members as

distinguished from non-members. In view of the great reliance placed on
accreditation by the public and the government, these associations must as-

sume responsibility not only to their membership but also to society.""
The appellate court in Marjorie Webster alleviated the conceptual
uncertainty in the trial court opinion by clearly separating the quasipublic and quasi-governmental analyses. In doing so, the appellate
court opinion is more hesitant and particular in the way it applies
the quasi-public category to accreditation.
While overruling the ultimate conclusion reached by the trial court
through quasi-public analysis, the appellate court does not reject application of the category to accrediting agencies. To the contrary, it
strongly supports the theory's viability but cautions that its "general
propositions must not be allowed to obscure the specific relevant
facts of each individual case. In particular, the extent to which [judicial] deference is due to the professional judgment of the association
will vary both with the subject matter at issue and with the degree of
harm resulting from the association's action. '49
Applying this tighter conceptualization of the quasi-public category, the appellate court concluded that the defendant's refusal to
consider Marjorie Webster's application for accreditation was a reasonable action when measured by the standards derived from the
quasi-public category.
Since Marjorie Webster, two other court cases have applied the
quasi-public label to accrediting agencies and used this analysis as
the primary means of dealing with accreditation questions. In Rockland Institute v. Association of Independent Colleges and Schools,50
4* Marjorie

Webster Junior College v. Middle States Ass'n, 362 F. Supp. 459 (D.D.C. 1969),
rev'd, 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
40 302 F. Supp. at 470.

" Rockland Institute v. Ass'n of Independent Colleges and Schools, 412 F. Supp. 1015 (C.D.
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the court relied on both the Falcone and the Marjorie Webster decisions, implicitly labeling the defendant accrediting agency as quasipublic. Using standards from those cases, the court held that the defendant acted lawfully in withdrawing Rockland's accreditation. In
Marlboro Corporation v. Association of Independent Colleges and
Schools,51 the trial court held that "private associations like defendants are 'quasi-public' and must follow fair procedures reasonably
related to their legitimate purposes.

' 52

On appeal, the appellate court

quoted this language of the trial court and, after lengthy analysis,
concluded that the defendant's action complied with applicable common law standards. Thus both the Rockland Institute and Marlboro
Corporation cases confirm the approach to accrediting agencies
staked out in the Marjorie Webster litigation. Since Rockland and
Marlboro are also the latest cases in this line, they provide the latest
word on application of the quasi-public theory to accreditation.
In light of these legal trends, accrediting agencies can no longer be
considered either truly "private" or truly "voluntary" associations.
The societal importance of accreditation and its importance to individual institutions and programs have evolved to the point that accrediting agencies have become "quasi-public."
VII. The Best Category for Accreditation
Based on the above legal developments, some conclusions may be
drawn about the legal categories appropriate for accreditation. It is
clear that the first possible label, "governmental" entity, is generally
inapplicable. Only a few governments sponsor activities which they or
the U.S. Department of Education consider to be accreditation; and
even these activities are not recognized as genuine accreditation by
much of the accrediting community. Nor is the "private" entity label
a viable option. Once suitable, as illustrated by the North Dakota
litigation, this traditional label does not fit the contemporary world
of accreditation. It has been outrun by evolutionary changes in the
role of higher education, societal reliance on accreditation, and governmental relationships with accrediting agencies.
The real choice, therefore, is between the "quasi-governmental"
and "quasi-public" labels. The theories underlying both categories
are supported by modern legal developments, and both categories
Cal. 1976).
11 Marlboro Corp. v. Ass'n of Independent Colleges and Schools, 416 F. Supp. 958 (D.Mass.
1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 78 (1st Cir. 1977)
61

416 F. Supp. at 959.
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have been used receptively in recent accreditation litigation. Courts
have not yet been forced to choose between the two nor is a clear
judicial preference for one category over the other yet apparent. At
present, therefore, either or both categories may apply to a particular
accreditation case. An accrediting agency may assert a preference for
one of these two categories; it may, in consultation with counsel,
structure its activities to minimize the likelihood that courts would
place in it the disfavored category; but it should not ignore either
category or refuse to take both seriously.
In the short run, the co-existence of two legal models for accrediting agencies will not make their life unmanageable. To date courts
have devised similar legal requirements under each model and, when
courts have consulted both categories in the same case, the result has
been the same under each category. The Marjorie Webster trial
court, for instance, held in the plaintiff's favor under both the quasipublic and the quasi-governmental categories. Although the appellate
court disagreed, it maintained consistency between categories by deciding for the defendants under both. In the Marlboro Corporation
litigation, the appellate court considered both categories, indicating
that the legal requirements and result would be the same under each:
"whether the process is measured against constitutional or common
law standards, current doctrine teaches that procedural fairness is a
flexible concept, in which the nature of the controversy and the competing interests of the parties are considered on a case-by-case basis. 'S Given this symmetry in legal doctrine, accrediting agencies at

present can comply with their reponsibilities under both categories in
the same way and at the same time.
In the long run, however, the law cannot be expected to maintain
this consistency. The emerging principles applicable to accreditation
are still rough-hewn; the refinements to come are likely to uncover
some dissonance between categories. New questions may arise which,
on close analysis, yield a different answer under each category. In
such circumstances courts - and other governmental bodies which
follow their lead - may choose between categories. The accrediting
community should continue to plan for that eventuality so it may
facilitate a choice and other refinements in the law which best serve
its and society's needs.
The quasi-public category will likely serve long-range educational
and societal needs better than the quasi-governmental category. The
quasi-governmental label covers a wide variety of legal entities and a
556 F.2d at 81.
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myriad of problems unrelated to accreditation or education. The constitutional requirements attached to this category (such as due process, equal protection, and free speech) can be complex and technical.
The quasi-public category, in contrast, deals specifically with professional associations and their particular role in American society.", Its
legal requirements are flexible and relatively free of technical doctrine. 55 Thus, under the quasi-public category, the law's contours can
better be shaped to the special considerations prevailing when a
court is asked to review the expert judgments of a professional association. As the more focused approach, the quasi-public theory has
also accumulated a greater body of relevant experience than the
quasi-governmental theory in accreditation cases, as well as numerous cases dealing with other entities applying professional standards
through peer review, such as medical societies. This greater body of
experience, combined with the greater adaptability to the special
problems of professional associations, should make the quasi-public
category more useful to courts, more understandable and workable
for educators, and more responsive to changing societal needs.
An additional strength of the quasi-public category is the acceptance it has achieved from sources other than courts. The accrediting
community itself and knowledgeable outsiders have been hospitable
to a view of accreditation as a quasi-public function. In 1971-72, an
independent commission conducted a Study of Accreditation in Selected Health Education Programs (SASHEP). Its final report, with
numerous implementation recommendations, stated that the "perception of accreditation as a private activity" is "anachronistic" and
that accreditation for specialized fields of study has "substantial public trust functions and responsibilities.

56

For a study published in

1973, Jerry W. Miller used the "Delphi" procedure to assemble the
views of 100 persons selected for their recognized knowledge about
accreditation. The group's predominant view was that "accreditation
should serve no function which conflicts with the public interest" and
should conduct its business essentially as a public trust.57
The same view of accreditation is expressed by The Council on
Postsecondary Accreditation (COPA), the national nongovernmental
'4 W. KAPLIN, Professional Power and
WASH. L. RzV. 710, 731-733 (1976).

JudicialReview: The Health Professions, 44 GEo.

" Id. at 742-745.
SASHEP COMMISSION REPORT 5, 19, 27, 38-39 (Nat'l Comm'n on Accrediting, 1972).
'7 J. MILLER, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF NONGOVERNMENTAL POSTSECONDARY ACCREDITATION: RELATIONSHIP TO USES OF ACCREDITATION

ITING,

1973).

109, 120-21, 123-125

(NAT'L COMM'N ON

ACcRED-
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monitoring body for accrediting agencies:
While accreditation is basically a private, voluntary process, accrediting decisions are used as a consideration in many formal actions-by government
funding agencies, scholarship commissions, foundations, employers, counselors, and potential students. Accrediting bodies have, therefore, come to be
viewed as quasi-public entities with certain responsibilities to the many
groups which interact with the educational community.",

COPA furthers this view of accreditation in its "Provisions and
Procedures for Becoming Recognized as an Accrediting Agency for
Postsecondary Educational Institutions or Programs."5 9 Part B of the
Provisions, in particular, stresses the "public responsibility" of accrediting agencies and the need for "effective public representation"
on accrediting bodies-themes which COPA elucidates in a supplementary policy statement, "Accreditation and the Public Interest."6 0
A comparable position is taken by the United States Department
of Education, the primary government agency concerned with accreditation. The preface to its "Criteria and Procedures for Recognition
of Nationally Recognized Accrediting Agencies and Associations"
characterizes accrediting agencies as "nongovernmental," "voluntary," and "private." 1 But the Criteria themselves underscore the
"public" responsibilities of accrediting agencies. Section 149.2, for instance, defines accrediting as a form of "public recognition" for an
educational institution or program;"' and Section 149.6(b) requires
that a recognized agency "take into account the rights, responsibilities, and interests of students, the general public, the academic, professional, or occupational fields involved, and institutions. 3 Other
provisions require that accrediting agencies be "responsive to the
public interest" and that they include "representatives of the public"
in their organizational structures."
" The Council on Postsecondary Accreditation, The Balance Wheel for Accreditation, 1
(1981).
59 The Council on Postsecondary Accreditation, Provisions and Procedures for Becoming
Recognized as an Accrediting Agency for PostsecondaryEducationalInstitutionsor Programs
(1981).
" The Council on Postsecondary Accreditation, Policy Statement on Accreditation and the
Public Interest (1980).
41 Supra note 13, at cover inset and p.1.
02 Id. at 5; 34 C.F.R. § 603.2.
" Id. at 7; 34 C.F.R. § 603.6(b).
" Id. at 7; 34 C.F.R. § 603.6(b)(2). The ED Criteria for Recognition have been evaluated-positively-in a study and report by the Educational Testing Service; see J. Warren,
"Evaluation of OE Criteria for the Recognition of Accrediting and State Approval Agencies"
(ETS, 1980)(Contract No. 300-77-0497, Office Of Program Evaluation, U.S. Department of
Education).
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Thus the intrinsic value of the quasi-public theory and its greater
use by courts in professional contexts, combined with the emphasis
on accreditation's public responsibilities by leading persons and organizations, make the quasi-public category the "best" choice for
accreditation.
VIII.

Legal Responsibilities for Accreditation

If the quasi-public category is the best for accreditation, it is important to understand the legal standards applicable to this category
and the legal responsibilities they impose on accrediting agencies.
?Given the current similarity between the standards courts have used
under the quasi-public and quasi-governmental categories, an understanding of the former category will also help agencies deal with the
latter, at least in the short run.
James v. Marinship Corporation,the forerunner of modern precedents, established that quasi-public entities must not act "contrary
to public policy. ' 5 The court identified a "public policy against racial discrimination"" and held that the defendant, a closed shop
union, had violated that policy by excluding the plaintiffs from union
membership. The other leading forerunner, the Falcone case, also
used a public policy standard, emphasizing that "public policy is the
dominant factor in the molding and remodeling of common law principles to the high end that they soundly serve the public interest
"67 According to Falcone, public policy requires that a quasi-public entity's "monopoly" power:
[S]hould be viewed judicially as a fiduciary power to be exercised in a reasonable and lawful manner for the advancement of the interests of the...

profession and the public generally ... When ... its action has no relation to the ... elevation of professional standards but runs strongly
counter to the public policy of our State and the true interests of justice, it
should and will be striken [sic] down."8

In Parsons College, the first accreditation case to consider the
quasi-public category, the plaintiff college argued that accrediting decisions must not be "contrary to rudimentary due process or
"6

155 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1944). Public policy, like the parallel concept of "public interest," has

not been specifically defined in the law but may be discovered by courts in constitutions, statutes, official government policies and regulations, the trend of prior judicial precedents, and
sometimes by resort to history, philosophy, or social science. Id. at 335.
" Id. at 339.
" Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 170 A.2d at 795.
Is Id. at 799-800.
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grounded in arbitrariness." 9 Although questioning its validity, the
court did apply this standard. In Marjorie Webster, both trial and
appellate courts were much less oblique. The trial court's opinion
contains the most emphatic description to date of the standards applicable to accreditation:
[Accrediting] associations must assume responsibility not only to their
membership but also to society... The regional accrediting associations
. . .have an opportunity to provide new leadership in orienting their poli-

cies toward the broader welfare of society and the public interest... Public policy requires that . . [the accrediting] power of the defendant must
be exercised in a reasonable manner in the public interest.70

The Marjorie Webster appellate court agreed generally with the
trial court: "The standards set must be reasonable, applied with an
even hand, and not in conflict with the public policy of the jurisdiction. '71 In applying that principle to the defendant accrediting
agency, however, the appellate court was more circumspect than the
trial court, emphasizing that "judicial review of appellant's standards
should accord substantial deference to appellant's judgment regarding the ends that it serves and the means most appropriate to those
ends. 7 2 The appellate court would uphold an accrediting agency's
decision unless, after according such deference, the decision can be
said to be "an unreasonable means of seeking to reach the ends
sought. '73 If the issue concerns not substantive standards themselves
but rather "the fairness of the procedures by which the challenged
determination was reached, less deference may be due professional
74
judgment.
The last two accreditation cases, Rockland Institute and Marlboro
Corporation, both deal with procedural requirements - the other
side of the substance/procedure dichotomy set out in Marjorie Webster. The Rockland case focused on the most basic requirement: the
agency must have "followed its own established procedures."75 The
Marlborocase added a second, qualitative, requirement: a quasi-public entity must have "fair procedures reasonably related to.

.

. [its]

legitimate purposes. "76 Thus, an accrediting agency has a legal reParsons College v. North Central Ass'n, 271 F. Supp. at 71.
Marjorie Webster Junior College v. Middle States Ass'n, 302 F. Supp. at 470, 473.
71Marjorie Webster Junior College v. Middle States Ass'n, 432 F.2d at 655.
72Id. at 657.
'9

70

7"Id.

74Id. at 656.
73
76

412 F. Supp. at 1016.
416 F. Supp. at 959.
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sponsibility, not only to apply its own procedures in making deci'77
sions, but also to assure that those procedures are "fair.
Rockland also includes the requirement that an agency's decision
must not be "arbitrary or unreasonable. ' 78 The court's opinion relies
on an important gauge of reasonableness: the decision must be "supported by substantial evidence and reasonably related to the legitimate professional purposes of the association. 7' 9 The court extracted
this standard from an earlier medical society case which explained it
as a "just cause" requirement. The opinion in this case, Blende v.
Maricopa County Medical Society,80 adds further gloss to the reasonableness standard:
The judicial process involved in determining such a standard of reasonableness is essentially one of balancing individual, group, and public interests
... When examining the justification for . . . [a particular action], the

court should consider several factors: the social value of the goal of the...
[association's] action; the appropriateness of the . . . [association] as a

means for achieving the goal; and the reasonablensss of this particular action of the [association] in relation to the goal."

The various standards suggested in these cases may seem vague
and cryptic. Concepts such as "reasonablensss" and "fairness" tend
to dangle enticingly out of reach as one attempts to discern their
meaning in concrete situations. Different cases, moreover, speak to
different aspects of accrediting agencies' legal responsibilities. Thus
no one standard or case, standing alone, provides a clear or complete
picture. To develop such a picture, all the standards and cases must
be consulted and put within the framework of the legal process.
What image then emerges, and how can accrediting agencies be
guided by it in the workaday world?
IX.

Fulfilling Legal Responsibilities: The Public Interest
Concept

Judicial opinions seldom contain all the guidance one might wish
to find there. Rather than "legislating" such specifics, courts often
leave a range of discretion in which affected entities may decide for
themselves how best to fulfill judicial mandates. That is what has
happened in the quasi-public entity cases. Thus such entities may
themselves give substance to the concepts developed by the courts.
See W. Kaplin, supra note 54, at 746-750.
412 F. Supp. at 1016.
70 Id.
80 Blende v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 393 P.2d 926 (Ariz. 1964).
s1Id. at 930.
7s
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Governmental agencies may also have a role. In the case of accreditation, COPA has devised "Provisions for Recognition" as an accrediting agency, 82 "Interpretive Guidelines" which further clarify the recognition provisions," and the policy statement "Accreditation and
the Public Interest."' 4 The U.S. Department of Education publishes
its "Criteria for Nationally Recognized Accrediting Agencies." 5 In
addition, the SASHEP Study Commission developed an important
statement of "Basic Policies for Accreditation" pertaining to all of
postsecondary accreditation." These sources can be valuable guides
for accrediting agencies as they determine how best to fulfill their
legal responsibilities as quasi-public entities.
Moreover, the court decisions, taken together, do evince a new
spirit concerning accreditation and its responsiblities which can be an
important guidepost in complying with legal requirements. In particular, the concept of "public interest," which often appears in court
opinions and has been adopted in both COPA and Department of
Education pronouncements, can be a critical touchstone.
A.

Defining the Public Interest

At first glance, "public interest" may be the most elusive of all the
standards employed by courts. 7 What is the public interest? Under
what circumstances is a particular action "contrary to" the public interest? These questions are theoretical and philosophical, but some
answers to them, even if incomplete, will enhance the usefulness of
the public interest standard as the primary guidepost for accrediting
agencies.
The term public interest is frequently used in the law and appears
in both statutes and court decisions. In cases like Falcone, public interest and "public policy" are used interchangeably. Courts have
often explored the term but have never succeeded in developing a
detailed definition. According to the courts, "public interest means
more than mere public curiosity. To be a matter involving public interest, something must be involved in which the public, the comnmu8

Provisions and Procedures for Becoming Recognized as an Accrediting Agency, supra

note 59, at pp. 1-2.

"The Council on Postsecondary Accreditation, Interpretive Guidelinesfor Recognition Provisions (1981).
84 Supra note 60.
"Supra note 13, at pp. 5-8; 34 C.F.R. § 603.
SASHEP, supra note 56, at 17-29.
But see MACCORmicK, LEGAL RzASONMNG AND LEGAL THEORy, ch. 5 (Clarendon Press,
1978), which analyzes public interest/public policy arguments as an integral part of a theory of

legal reasoning.
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nity at large, has an interest or a right which may be affected."8 8

Public interest in the law, then, is "distinguished from private or personal [interest]," with the public interest being one "of, pertaining to,
or affecting the people at large or the community." 89 Thus, an activity may become "clothed with a public interest when.

.

. [done] in a

manner to make it of public consequence and affect the community
at large."90

The public interest is not an ideal; it is based on "that which the
community wants" rather than "that which an ideal community
ought to want."91 Nor is public interest a static concept. It expand(s)
"with the growing complexity and integration of society."92 "Plainly
circumstances may so change in time or so differ in space, as to
clothe with . . . [a public interest] what at other times or in other

places would be a matter of purely private concern."93
This general definition is consistent with the court's use of public
interest in the accrediting cases. Although the accrediting cases do
not tailor the definition to fit accreditation specifically, useful attempts have been made in other quarters. In his study on Organizational Structure of Non-Governmental PostsecondaryAccreditation,
Jerry W. Miller defines public interest as "the community of societal
interests held by the public in general which may be congruent with
but which tends to transcend the economic, personal, and professional interests of accrediting agencies and associations or of any
other private group or individual in society.

'9 4

In its "Policy State-

ment on Accreditation and the Public Interest," COPA defines public
interest as "the interest of students and parents and the public generally as purchaser, supporter, and consumer of educational services. '"" In his paper on Accreditation and the Public Interest, William K. Selden defines public interest simply as "the welfare of
society," which he distinguished from "the economic, professional or
social benefit" of the institutions and professions which control accrediting activities. 8
Under these definitions, an action would be "contrary to" the pubs State v. North Dakota Hosp. Serv. Ass'n, 106 N.W.2d 545, 547 (N.D. 1960).
" Farrell v. New York Evening Post, 3 N.Y.S.2d 1018, 1021 (1938).
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877).
s Barton v. Codington County, 2 N.W.2d 337, 343 (S. Dak. 1942), citing P. Winfield, Public
Policy in the English Common Law, 42 HRv.L. Rv.76, 99-100 (1928).
"2 Hogue v. Housing Auth., 144 S.W.2d 49, 56 (1940).
" Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1940).
J. MILLER, supra note 57, at 7.

oSupra note 60, at p. 1.
W. SELDEN, ACCREDITATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 8 (COPA, 1976).
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lic interest if it supported the personal or pecuniary interests of individuals or organizations at the expense of the broader interests of
society. Or, to borrow again from a court decision, an entity would
act contrary to the public interest if it failed to assume "an affirmative obligation" to the public and "to be reasonable in dealing" with
public needs.9 7 The goal is not that the quasi-public entity ignore its
own legitimate needs or those of its members; rather, the goal is that
the entity reconcile these needs with broader societal needs, giving
predominance to the latter if there is a conflict.
B.

Promoting the Public Interest

If the public interest, so defined, is accreditation's guidepost, it remains to be determined how accrediting agencies can best promote
the public interest rather than narrower interests which may be implicated in accreditation decisions. 8 One answer to this question can
be obtained by consulting the following sources: the COPA provisions, guidelines, and policy statements, the U.S. Department of Education criteria, and the SASHEP statement of basic policies.0 9 Particularly important are Part B of the COPA provisions and
guidelines, dealing with "public responsibility; 10 0 COPA's policy
statement on "the public interest,"1 0 1 section 149.6(b) of the ED criteria dealing with "Responsibility;" 10 2 and principles I(A) and (B),
II(C) and (F), III(A) and (B), and V(A) in the SASHEP statement,
dealing
with accreditation's
societal
purposes
and their
implementation. 10 3
A deeper answer to the question, however, requires exploration of
four interrelated concepts critical to accreditation's 'future: (1) Autonomy, (2) Impartiality, (3) Expertise, and (4) Public
Representation.
Autonomy. Accrediting agencies should be free from restraints
which may affect their freedom or capacity to make accrediting decisions. To attain such autonomy, the accrediting body must operate
independent of political or economic influences either within or
Chase-Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 536 (1923).
See generally H. Seidman, "Accreditation of Postsecondary Education: Problems in Organization," in SASHEP Pt. I Staff Working Papers,at F-3 to F-7 (Nat'l Comm'n on Accrediting, 1971).
" Notes, 13, 56, 58, 59, and 60, supra.
10o Provisions and Procedures,supra note 59, at 2; Interpretive Guidelines,supra note 83, at
2.
101Supra note 60.
101 Supra note 13, at 6-8; 34 C.F.R. § 603.6(b).
103 Supra note 56, at 18-19, 21, 22, 23-24, & 27-28.
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outside the organization which sponsors the accrediting activity.
Thus the accrediting body should not be obligated to, nor should its
decisions on particular schools or programs be reviewed by, any other
body having political or economic goals that may conflict with the
educational goals of accreditation. Were an accrediting body structured to represent the interests of member institutions, the sponsoring profession, or some other particular interest, such an arrangement could skew its decision-making process in favor of those
competing narrower interests to the detriment of the public interest.
Impartiality.In their individual capacities, members of accrediting
agencies should be free from any personal or pecuniary interest in the
outcome of accrediting decisions. Like autonomy, "conflicts of interest" on the part of individual members may also restrain free choice
and tilt accreditation decisions in favor of narrower competing interests at the expense of the public interest.
"Conflict of interest" has been defined in the law as "a situation in
which regard for one duty tends to lead to disregard of another,'' O"
and as "a clash between public interest and the private pecuniary
interest of the individual concerned.

' 10 5

Both constitutional due pro-

cess and common law notions of fairness condemn the existence of
such conflicts because they tend to undermine the decisionmaker's
impartiality. 106
This problem was discussed in one of the accreditation cases Marlboro Corporation v. Association of Independent Colleges and
Schools107 - in which the defendant had denied the plaintiff's application for renewal of accreditation. The plaintiff school charged that
the chairman of the accrediting commission was also the president of
a school in direct competition with the plaintiff which would "fall
heir to" its business if accreditation were denied. Thus, the school
contended, the chairman had a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of the proceeding, and this apparent impropriety rendered the
proceeding unlawful. Although the court called this question "troublesome," it held that the school had not shown "sufficient actual or
apparent impropriety."10 The court stressed that the individual in
question "took no part in the discussion or vote," and though he was
I

U.S. v. Miller, 463 F.2d 600, 602 (1st Cir. 1972).
Gardner v. Nashville Housing Auth., 514 F.2d 38, 41 (6th Cir. 1975).
See, e.g., Schweiker v. McClure, 102 S. Ct. 1665 (1982); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564
(1973); Blenko v. Schmeltz, 62 Pa. 365, 67 A.2d 99 (1949).
416 F. Supp. 958 (D. Mass. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 78 (1st Cir. 1977).
556 F.2d at 82.
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present at the proceeding, he did not "chair or participate" in it. o1°
Thus good policy suggests, and the law requires, that accrediting
agency members be impartial decisionmakers free from actual or apparent conflicts of interest. This impartiality is the second ingredient
in the mix assuring that accrediting agencies are responsive to the
public interest. Combined with the first ingredient, autonomy, it creates an atmosphere for fair and constructive accreditation decision
making. But autonomy and impartiality only help to prevent bad decisions; they do not guarantee good ones. In this sense, they are like a
vacuum that needs to be filled: Other ingredients must be added to
facilitate good decision making: expertise and public representation.
Expertise. In selecting the members of the accrediting body, in
training them, and in providing support services to them, accrediting
agencies should bring relevant expertise to bear on the accreditation
process. Four kinds of expertise are important: educational expertise;
expertise in the professional or occupational discipline being accredited; expertise in disciplines functionally related to the one being accre.dited; and expertise of the generalist - the expert at weaving together the separate views of the specialists. 110
In the real world, this goal of applying expertise exists in tension
with the goals of autonomy and impartiality. Persons with the greatest expertise are likely to be involved in other educational or professional pursuits which inhibit their independence. For instance, persons with expertise in education or in the professional discipline
being evaluated may be in competition with the institutions or programs they are judging. Such experts may also be involved in or affected by "turf" conflicts among professions or subgroups within a
particular profession, or they may have other professional interests or
obligations which limit their impartiality or the accrediting body's
automony. Thus, carried to their extremes, autonomy and impartiality could undermine achievement of the goal of maximizing expert
input into accrediting decisions. The goal of expertise must therefore
be balanced against the other goals of autonomy and impartiality,
with the realization that real world practicalities prohibit complete
fulfillment of all three goals. If accrediting agency members are to be
experts, most of them, at least, cannot be completely free of every
appearance of conflict of interest. The greatest evil to avoid is the
situation where the decision to be made may "directly or substan109Id.
210See Kaplin, ProfessionalPower and JudicialReview: The Health Professions, supra note
54, at 720-724.
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tially affect the institution or program with which. . . [the accrediting agency member] is associated or its competitive position with a
neighboring institution or program under review."'1 11
Public Representation. Perhaps the major technique for enhancing
sensitivity to the public interest in accreditation is to include public
representatives on the accrediting body. The U.S. Department of Education's recognition criteria define such persons as "representatives
who are laymen in the sense that they are not educators in, or members of, the profession for which the students are being prepared, nor
in any way are directly related to the institutions or programs being
evaluated." 11 2 COPA's "Policy Statement on Accreditation and the
Public Interest" includes a lengthier definition which emphasizes
that a public representative should be "a person with an informed,
broad-gauged community point of view."' s Miller and Selden both
include helpful definitions and discussions of public representatives
11 4
in their studies.
Broad-based public representation helps ensure the autonomy of
the accrediting commission and the impartiality of its members by
inserting into the process persons representative of broader interests,
further removed from possible conflicts. Thus, public representatives
can directly enhance fulfillment of the first two goals for accrediting
discussed above. In addition, public representatives can enhance the
third goal by bringing to the accrediting process what can be considered a fifth type of relevant expertise: the expert sense of the societal
interests which are implicated in accreditation decision making. It
would be short-sighted, however, to ignore the other four types of
expertise in selecting public representatives. Such persons may also
have some form of educational expertise in instruction, administration, or measurement and evaluation. They may have expertise in
some discipline which is functionally related to the one whose programs are being accredited, or they may have the expertise of the
generalist and be particularly adept at weaving together the various
views expressed by the accrediting body. In order to encourage selection of representatives with these additional dimensions of expertise,
neither the selection process nor the qualification requirements
should be so preoccupied with the first two goals (autonomy and im"I The Council on Postsecondary Accreditation, Policy Statement on Accreditation and the
Public Interest 3 (1980).
112 NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED ACCREDITING AGENCIES AND ASSOCIATIONS: CRITERIA AND PROCE-

DURES FOR LISTING, supra note 13, at 5; 34 C.F.R. § 603.2.
"I Supra note 60, at 2.
114 J. MILLER, supra note 57, at 8, 51-56, 138-139; and W. SELDEN, supra note 96, at 19-24.
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partiality) that selection of expert public representatives becomes
improbable.
It is the ability to procure these four ingredients to accreditation
decision making, and to accommodate the potential conflicts in procuring all four, that will ultimately determine whether accrediting
agencies indeed make decisions representing the public interest. It is
through successful procurement and accommodation that public confidence in accreditation can be achieved and the public interest in
accreditation can be protected.
X.

Conclusion

In law as in politics, labeling can create overbroad generalizations
and distract attention from more important questions. This is not the
case, however, with the body of law which categorizes accrediting
agencies. Due to evolutionary developments in both accreditation and
law, the labeling question has become critical. The labels serve to
clarify the legal responsibilities of accrediting agencies and provide
standards to guide accreditation decision making. The label a court
chooses establishes its fundamental orientation toward the entity
before it. Often the orientation of legislatures and administrative
agencies will be influenced by the course taken by the judiciary. The
label which an agency applies to itself will also affect its view of itself
and its work.
In earlier times, accrediting agencies wore the label "private."
Courts and government agencies accepted this label. By the 1970's,
both attitudes and labels had changed. A consensus has now appeared that accrediting agencies and the interests they affect are
more public than private. This view of accreditation can be accommodated by the "quasi-governmental" and "quasi-public" categories.
There are viable arguments for applying both categories to accreditation. The latter category, however, is more adaptable to the particular functions of accrediting agencies and more accepted by the accrediting community and government agencies. In the long run, the
education world and society will be best served by viewing accrediting agencies, for both legal and policy purposes, as quasi-public
entities.
The quasi-public category of law focuses attention on the public
service aspects of included entities. It provides a set of variously defined standards to guide courts in reviewing decisions of accrediting
agencies and to guide accrediting officials and public policymakers in
fulfilling accreditation's responsibilities to the public. This category
also establishes the fundamental goal for accrediting agencies to pur-
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sue: serving the "public interest." This concept, though elusive, is the
key to understanding the quasi-public category. Broken into its four
critical ingredients, autonomy, impartiality, expertise, and public
representation, the public interest concept should serve as the fundamental guidepost for marking accreditation's place in the educational
world and the broader American society.

